C OMMENTARY TO D EAN F ERSHÉE ’ S
P RESENTATION
George Kuney
Autumn Bowling:
Fantastic. We're ended a little bit early there. And so our faculty
discussant is UT Law’s Professor George Kuney. So, I'll go ahead and hand
it over to him.
George Kuney:1
I have a few comments related to Dean Fershée ’s presentation.
First, I share many of the same reactions as he does regarding the
misuse of corporate terms, names, and titles. Naming and categorizing are
very, very important in law. Precise wording is very important. I am let
down when loose language works its way into judicial opinions and that
loose language radiates outward and compounds the confusion.
Second, for a long time I have been doing a lot of work with corporate
structures, successor liability, and piercing the corporate veil. A lot of that
relates to bankruptcy, insolvency, and restructuring practice. What I've
seen over the last twenty years is that plaintiffs’ lawyers who are bringing
lawsuits alleging something like veil piercing liability or corporate group
liability are increasingly pleading without much specificity. For example,
when faced with a subsidiary that is arguably liable for a tort but may not
have deep pockets beyond available insurance, they seek to proceed against
the parent or a whole corporate group because of general allegations of
“control.”2 The overarching theme that they're using is some vague
allegations relating to agency, actual or implied, and that this corporate
1 The University of Tennessee College of Law, Lindsay Young Distinguished
Professor of Law and Director of the Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law and the
LL.M. in United States Business Law program.
2 “Control group liability” is a special ERISA doctrine “whereby other entities can
be responsible for the pension withdrawal liability of the sponsor of a pension plan based
on common ownership.” Cohen v. Jaffe, Raitt, Heure & Weiss, P.C., No. 16-CV-11484,
2017 WL 2833535, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2017). It is not a doctrine with broad
applicability in corporate or entity law.
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group operates as a corporate group and is a “top down” organization. As
a result, they assert that we should not look at all at the corporate
formalities and not honor and respect the separateness of the entities. The
whole corporate group should be liable for the torts (and presumably
other liabilities) of any one subsidiary.
It used to be that the complaints I saw in this area were very precise
and specifically alleged apparent agency,3 actual agency,4 piercing the
corporate veil,5 alter ego,6 and the like. Now, these allegations have become
very vague and unfocused. Perhaps this is part of a strategy to shelter these
Although the exact formulations of the standard vary by jurisdiction, to establish
an apparent agency relationship the plaintiffs must generally prove “(a) a representation
by the purported principal; (b) a reliance on that representation by a third party; and (c)
a change in position by the third party in reliance on the representation.” Jackson Hewitt
v. Kaman 100 So. 3d 19, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). Apparent agency or agency “does
not arise from the subjective understanding of the person dealing with the purported
agent, nor from appearances created by the purported agent himself; instead, ‘apparent
authority’ exists only where the principal creates the appearance of an agency relationship.”
Izquierdo v. Hialeah Hosp., Inc., 709 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
4 Although formulations of the standard vary by jurisdiction, to establish an actual
agency relationship between an operating subsidiary and a parent, the plaintiff must
generally demonstrate: (1) acknowledgment by the parent that the subsidiary would act
as it agent; (2) the subsidiary’s acceptance of the undertaking; and (3) control by the
parent over the subsidiary’s actions that give rise to the plaintiff’s injuries. See, e.g., Ocana
v. Ford, 992 So. 2d 319, 326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
5 Again, jurisdictional formulations vary, but, in general, “piercing the corporate veil
is appropriate when three elements are present: (1) the corporation was a mere alter ego
of the shareholder, (2) the corporate structure was used to perpetrate a wrong, and (3)
piercing the corporate veil would achieve an equitable result. A claimant seeking to pierce
the corporate veil must make a clear and convincing showing that each consideration has
been met.” Lykins v. Thomas (In re Thomas), No. 10–38306 MER, 2013 WL 6840527,
at *5 (Bankr. D. Colo. Dec. 27, 2013).
6 The standards are enunciated differently in various jurisdictions, but the essence of
an alter ego claim is a lack of separateness between the two entities. So, for example
“[t]here are two essential elements of an alter ego claim under California law: (1) a finding
that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the individual no longer exist, and (2) that the failure to disregard the
corporation would result in fraud or injustice. California recognizes two types of alter ego
claims-generalized alter ego claims and particularized alter ego claims. The first alleges
injury to the corporation giving rise to a right of action in it against defendants and the
second involves causes of action that belong to each creditor individually. A general claim
is property of the debtor corporation and becomes property of the bankruptcy estate. A
particularized claim belongs to an individual creditor and does not become property of
the estate.” In re Landmark Fence Co., No. ED CV10-00143-AHM, 2010 WL 4924739,
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2010).
3
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claims from being easily dismissed at the motion stage by preventing a
direct and focused attack on them.7 It is very hard to knock out their vague
agency/control group theories with a defense summary judgment motion,
which keeps the lawsuit alive through trial, which, in turn, increases the
settlement value of the lawsuit. This is an area where a motion for a more
definite statement could and probably should be used early and often at
the inception of the case, prior to answering the complaint.8
Third, I am disturbed by the jurisdictions that treat piercing the
corporate (or other) veil and alter ego theories as questions for the jury. 9
Rather, I think that doctrines like this, which are sweeping and often based
upon multi-factor tests expressed as non-exclusive lists, should be reserved
for the judge entirely. This is the approach taken with the contract doctrine
of unconscionability, which also threatens to become unmoored in its
application if placed in the province of the jury.10 I can hold forth on what
I think about juries for a long time but I won't because I just got a two
minute warning flash, but even the best instructed juries are often hard
7 See, e.g., George v. Youngstown State Univ., 966 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2020) (Summary
judgment was not warranted in a former university professor's Title VII retaliation claim
because there were disputed material facts with respect to pretext, particularly as the
professor's evidence suggested that the university had several faculty retirements and
stable enrollment when it terminated him).
8 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) (“(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement. A party may
move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a
response. The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and must point
out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the court orders a more definite
statement and the order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within
the time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate
order.”).
9 See, e.g., Bryant v. Optima Int’l, 792 S.E.2d 489, 497 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (“When
litigated, the question of whether the alter ego doctrine applies is for the jury, unless there
is no evidence sufficient to justify disregarding the corporate form . . . .”); Logtale, Ltd.
v. Ikor, Inc., No. 11-cv-05452-EDL, 2015 WL 12942493 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2015)
(jury instructed “as to the elements and relevant factors to consider in making a
determination of whether alter ego liability exists”); Oost-Lievense v. North Am.
Consortium, P.C., 969 F. Supp. 874, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)(“[A]ny claim of veil piercing
based on an alter ego theory must be left for a jury. Resolution of the alter ego issue is
heavily fact specific.”).
10 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 3 (“The present section is addressed to the court, and the
decision to be made by it. The commercial evidence referred to in subsection (2) is for
the court’s consideration, not the jury’s. Only the agreement which results from the
court’s action on these matters is to be submitted to the general triers of facts.”).
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pressed to accurately apply fine legal distinctions. Many times juries will
come in the middle of a range of outcomes, when the actual result should
be one of the end points or the other.11
As the use of limited liability entities has proliferated, combined with
the broad adoption of blanket lien financing covering all of an entity’s
assets, operating subsidiaries have been rendered solvent for ordinary
commercial purposes, such as paying their bills, but insolvent apart from
any insurance coverage they may have if a tort judgment is rendered
against it.12 This is further compounded by the fact that insurance
requirements for various activities, where they exist,13 appear to be
decreasing in real terms, due to the effect of inflation.
For example, consider a lawsuit where, if the plaintiff wins, she ought to be
awarded $500,000, or if she loses, she should get zero. The jury comes back and awards
$40,000 because well, although we find for the defendant, the plaintiff was hurt and
“should get something.” Of course, this can be fixed with a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the pleadings, but the jury’s behavior is the point.
12 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Abstract, The Death of Liability. 106 YALE L.J. 1, (1996)
(“Based on systems/strategic analysis, this paper predicts the complete failure of legal
liability system. Liability is the system by which injured persons recover money damages
from those who injure them. The system operates through the entry and enforcement of
judgments by the courts. The paper argues that the system is vulnerable to defeat by a
variety of judgment proofing techniques which can be categorized as secured debt
strategies, ownership strategies, exemption strategies, and foreign haven strategies.”).
13 Consider corporate groups that feature operating subsidiaries that provide medical
services. According to the Galagher Healthcare Industry Insights Blog: “No federal law
requires doctors to carry medical malpractice insurance, but some states do. Whether or
not doctors are required to have insurance depends upon the state where they practice.
Roughly 32 states require no medical malpractice insurance and have no minimum
carrying requirements. The other 18 states break down roughly into two groups—states
that require minimum levels of insurance and states that require medical professionals to
have some insurance to qualify for liability reforms in their state. . . . The following states
do not require medical malpractice insurance nor do they have minimum carrying
requirements: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and West Virginia. Even though these states have
no requirement for medical malpractice insurance nor minimum carrying requirements,
many physicians still face requirements to obtain malpractice insurance in certain
situations. Many hospitals require physicians with visiting privileges to obtain malpractice
insurance. And some healthcare insurance plans require any doctor who participates in
their coverage to have malpractice insurance.” Donavan Weger, Going Bare—Are
11
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These trends, taken together, provide a reason for plaintiffs’ attorneys
to turn to piercing or successor liability claims to seek some recovery for
their clients. They are just doing it in a very unfocused fashion, again,
probably strategically to keep the case alive with the threat of an adverse
verdict at trial for the defendant. This is all the more reason to keep
determinations of alter ego, veil piercing, and successor liability firmly in
the hands of the judge, not the jury. If there is a solution to the problem
of uncompensated victims, it lies with the legislature and an increase in
required insurance coverage for licensed and permitted activities that are
prone to tort liability. That solves the problem by creating a shared risk
pool, distributing that risk of loss across society. It also provides an
incentive to the operating units to conduct themselves in a careful and
prudent fashion, avoiding negligence, due to the function of insurance
ratings and the potential for lower premiums. Thus, we can have a system
that provides a fund to compensate victims while still respecting the
separate entity status of the individual entities within a corporate group.
The title of this talk was Limited Liability Gone Wild, but I would say it's
veil piercing and similar doctrines that have gone wild in response to the
expanded use of LLCs and other limited liability entities as the equivalent
of watertight compartments in a ship, so that if one subsidiary takes a hit
due to a tort judgment, the balance of the enterprise is largely unaffected.
Combined with low or no adequate insurance coverage at the operating
subsidiary level, the search for justice for victims has driven the plaintiffs’
bar in that direction. It is up to the legislature to increase insurance
requirements to take the pressure off of entity law to bend and be more
Doctors Required to Have Malpractice Insurance?, GALLAGHER HEALTHCARE: INDUS.
INSIGHTS BLOG, (last visited December 2, 2020), https://www.gallaghermalpractice.co
m/blog/post/going-bare-are-doctors-required-to-have-malpractice-insurance. And in
states that do have required medical malpractice coverage, that amount can be woefully
low. See, e.g., Professional Liability Insurance, CONN. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH (2021),
https://portal.ct.gov/DPH/Practitioner-Licensing-Investigations/Podiatry/Professional-Liability-Insurance (“individuals licensed and
providing direct patient care services, are required to maintain professional liability
insurance or other indemnity against liability for professional malpractice. The amount
of such insurance or indemnity for claims against injury or death for professional
malpractice must be not less than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) for one
person, per occurrence, with an aggregate of not less than one million five hundred
thousand dollars ($1,500,000). In the event that a licensee fails to maintain such
insurance or indemnity coverage, the Connecticut Medical Examining Board may restrict,
suspend, revoke, limit the right to practice or take action in accordance with Section 19a17, Connecticut General Statutes.”).
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liberal in granting what was always intended to be “extraordinary” relief.14
And, with that, I think I'll end my comments there and turn it over to the
next commentator.

See, e.g., Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enters., 397 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th
Cir. 2005)(“in Oregon piercing the corporate veil is an extraordinary remedy which exists
as a last resort . . . .”).
14

